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Roy Carter writes on corporate security and risk management and was a senior consultant for an international group of security companies.

The executive target
by Roy Carter


CONTENTS

Official attitude
Local feeling
Soft targets
Company image
Practical action
On the move
In a hazardous location



All over the world, in such diverse areas as Central America or the Middle East, the level of politically motivated violence increases almost daily. The victim's nationality - or supposed nationality - is often the sole reason for him or her being attacked. Gone forever are the days when kidnap and murder threatened only the wealthy and influential. Instead, political and religious fanatics often regard ordinary citizens as legitimate targets, and this view will become more prevalent as prominent people take ever more effective steps to protect themselves. The average traveller is much more vulnerable, but still worthy of publicity - which is generally the motive behind all terrorist action.

No one travelling to certain parts of the world can sensibly afford to ignore the danger. If the risk exists everywhere, it naturally increases dramatically in known trouble spots. Nor is it wise to rely on the law of averages for protection. Terrorism and crime thrive on complacency, and a fatalistic attitude can actually create danger. Awareness is vital, and it is surprisingly easy for any intelligent person to do the sort of homework that can pay life-saving dividends.

The first step is to understand something of the anatomy of political crime. Terrorist violence is rarely, if ever, carried out as randomly as it sometimes appears. Particularly in the case of kidnapping, the victim will first be observed - often for a period of days - for evidence of vulnerability. Translating an awareness of the threat into a few simple precautions means offering a difficult target to people who want an easy one. Invariably they will look elsewhere. It is impossible to say how many lives have been saved in this way, because the threat, by its very nature, is covert, but the number is undoubtedly high. The majority of terrorist abductions are facilitated by the victim developing a regular pattern of behaviour, or being ignorant of the dangers in a strange country. No experienced traveller would forego vital inoculations or fail to enquire about the drinking water. Testing the political climate should be regarded as a natural extension of the same safeguards. After all, the object is the same, and the price of failure at least as high.

Of course, the most straightforward response to ominous events is simply to cancel or postpone the visit. In extremes this option should not be disregarded, but there will be occasions, especially for the business traveller, when such a drastic answer is difficult or impossible. An intelligent interest in the press and television news is a fundamental requirement in making the final decision. Sensible analysis of media reports will answer many questions about known trouble spots and help predict others. If nothing else, it will highlight areas for further study. Equally important, but easily overlooked, sound research can help put less-serious situations into perspective. Unnecessary worry based on sensationalism or rumour can be a problem in itself.

Official attitude

It is crucial to get a balanced idea of the official attitude in the country to be visited. The host government's status and its relationship with the visitor's country are always critical factors. A basically hostile or unstable government will always increase the danger to individual travellers, either directly, or by such indirect means as ineffective policing. Examples of the former risk have been seen very clearly in the imprisonment of British citizens in Montenegro and Sierra Leone. Finding the truth will usually involve delving beneath the headlines. In Britain, an approach to the Foreign Office can produce surprisingly frank answers. Next, and more obviously, an analysis of recent terrorist activity should aim to answer three essential questions: when and where it happens, what form it takes and, most importantly, whom is it directed against? The first two answers will help establish precautionary measures. The third may indicate the degree of risk by revealing common factors. A series of identical abductions from motor vehicles in a particular part of the city, involving the same nationalities or professions, for example, should be augury enough for even the most sceptical observer.

Local feeling

It is also as well to know as much as possible about feelings among the local populace, which are by no means guaranteed to be the same as those of the government. National identity, and even religion, are often viewed quite differently 'on the street', although the bias is just as likely to be favourable as not. One need not even step outside the UK to demonstrate the validity of this advice, as an Englishman on the streets of west Belfast could quickly discover. And in a country with a large Western expatriate community, for instance, any Caucasian will generally be regarded as belonging to the predominant foreign nationality. Depending on the local situation, this type of mistaken identity can be dangerous or advantageous. At least one case, the 1985 abduction of three British visitors to Beirut by anti-American Muslim extremists, resulted from a mistake in the victims' nationality.

These attacks, and others involving French and US citizens, took place outside the victims' homes, highlighting perfectly standard terrorist methods. Known reference points such as home or places of work are always by far the most dangerous. The much-publicised kidnap and subsequent murder of former Italian premier Aldo Moro by the so-called Red Brigade was a notable example of this fact.

Soft targets

Such vital, but frequently forgotten, cases demonstrate more than a need for extra care at home and in the office. They show equally the terrorists' need for soft targets and their reluctance to proceed beyond basic research to find them. Terrorist resources and abilities are limited and to regard terrorists as being omnipotent is both mistaken and dangerous. Sensible precautions, such as varying times of arrival and departure, parking in different places - facing in different directions - watching for and reporting suspicious activity before leaving home, and entering and leaving by different doors, sound almost too simple, but they really do work. Only the most specific kind of motivation would justify continued surveillance of a clearly unpredictable and cautious target.

Company image

In addition to such general precautions, the business traveller will usually need to examine more particular issues. He will need to know how his company is perceived by various local factions. Previous threats or attacks on company employees should be studied with great care, as should incidents involving similar organisations. Where applicable, the local knowledge of expatriate colleagues will be useful, but watch for bias or over-familiarity. In the absence of any actual events, examine the company's standing in the community, especially where a conflict of interest exists between government and opposition groups. Never forget that a company will often be judged solely on the basis of its clients and associates. Always consider the status of the people you intend to visit. In these days of trade sanctions and mutually antagonistic markets, the chances are high that any association will offend someone.

Practical action

But analysis is only a partial answer. The results must be translated into coherent action. In extreme cases, the business traveller might need special training in such areas as defensive driving, emergency communication and surveillance recognition. Many of the larger companies will provide special briefings, but their failure to do so should never be taken as a sign that no danger exists. It could equally indicate a lack of awareness or a misguided decision not to cause alarm. There is nothing at all wrong with alarm if it is justified. It may even be a necessity.

Regardless of whether special training is given or not, all travellers to high-risk areas should follow certain basic rules as a matter of course. Keep friends and colleagues informed of your whereabouts and stay in company as much as possible. Use inconspicuous means of transport, but avoid public transport in favour of taxis. If in doubt, wait for the second cab in the rank. Never take a taxi if the driver is not alone. Dress down and leave expensive accessories at home. Don't book hotels in the company's name. In all, practise being nondescript in public.

Try not to think of these rules as an inconvenience but as a natural consequence of your stay in a strange country, like remembering to use a foreign language. Relaxing one rule might be tempting but it could be the mistake that negates all the rest. Better to extend precautions than limit them. For example, travelling regularly by the same route can undo all the good work on the home front. The kidnap and murder of German industrialist Hans-Martin Schleyer was carried out because his attackers were able to predict confidently both his route and timing. The murder in India of British diplomat Percy Norris by Middle Eastern terrorists likewise occurred along his regular route to work. Mr Norris was shot to death in the back seat of his chauffeur-driven car when it halted at traffic lights.

On the move

Make a habit of changing places in the car if you have a driver or use a taxi now and then instead. The chances of being attacked on the move are extremely remote. It follows that road junctions, traffic signals, etc., are always more dangerous than, say, stretches of dual carriageway. A prospective attacker will study his victim's route carefully and identify vulnerable spots. If he can do so, so can you. Be aware of these danger areas and stay on the alert when negotiating them. If driving yourself, keep the car in gear and ready for a quick getaway at temporary halts. Keep sufficient space between yourself and any leading vehicles to avoid being boxed in. Routinely lock all doors and keep the windows wound up.

Last of all, remember that you stand more chance of being an accident casualty than a victim of terrorism. Far from being dangerous, a little knowledge can stack the odds even higher in your favour. You'll probably never know if it passes the acid test - but you'll be in no doubt at all if it doesn't.


In a hazardous location

(1)Kidnappers need prior warning, tip-offs or knowledge of routine schedules to do their dirty work. Vary your schedule, change walking routes, and don't be shy about changing hotel rooms or assigned cabs.
(2)Avoid restaurants frequented by expats and tourists. don't make reservations in your own name. Don't sit outside.
(3)Get used to sitting near emergency exits, memorise escape routes so you can follow them in the dark, lock your doors and be wary at all times.
(4)Do not discuss your plans, accomodations, finances or politics with strangers.
(5)Do not show your name, country or hotel ID on luggage or clothing When a clerk asks for your room number, write it down for him rather than say it aloud.
(6)Watch your drinks being poured.

 
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